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Jean-François Gravier and Armin Meili were two leading pioneers of planning in France and
Switzerland. Gravier was the famous author of 
 
Paris et le désert français,
 
 first published in 1947; Meili
was the author of the first national conception of planning in Switzerland and was very active in
planning policy in the 1940s. Each has deeply influenced the implementation of planning policy in his
country and both have constructed their theories around a criticism of the city: Paris for Gravier; big
cities, in general, for Meili.
This paper first describes the recurrent critiques of the city in the thoughts of these authors. From
sterility to unhealthiness, they combine moral and physical criticisms. Although they belong to
different countries and different political cultures, their thoughts take root in surprisingly common
backgrounds based on the strength of ruralism and the political context of fascism. Finally, an analysis
of their similar propositions concerning town and country planning policies is offered. The lessons of
Gravier and Meili are based on different myths which the article will attempt to analyse.
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ning; and urban history. His publications include 
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Introduction
 
This paper is concerned with the birth and development of planning in France and
Switzerland from the 1940s to the end of the twentieth century, as seen through the work of
two major pioneers: Jean-François Gravier (1915–2005) and Armin Meili (1892–1981).
Both authors present a very strong bias against big cities.
Gravier, a geographer, is the author of 
 
Paris et le désert français
 
 [Paris and the French
desert] first published in 1947 (Fig. 1) [1], when he was an employee at the Ministry of
Urban Planning and Reconstruction. It was written during the Vichy regime (1940–4) but
later had an immense impact on French planning. The book has known three editions: each
different from the others. The first one (1947) is long (457 pp.), relies heavily on census
Figure 1. Title page of Gravier’s book, Paris and the French desert (third edition, 1972).
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figures and statistical arguments and at the same time is politically motivated. In it, Gravier,
who was very influenced by the Great Depression and wrote during the quasi-fascist regime
of Pétain, admired war planning, Soviet five-year plans and suggested drastic policies
(destruction of properties, forced transfers of personnel, racist filtering of migrants, etc.).
The second edition (1953) is shorter, with fewer figures and more palatable propositions.
The last one (1972) is cleansed of most references to the Soviet Union, of racist statements
and long statistical tables; it is easier to read but may seem somewhat weaker. Gravier
underlined a basic contrast structuring French territory: Paris versus the rest of France,
traditionally called 
 
la Province
 
. He proposed to found all town and country planning policy
on one principle: to restore ‘equilibrium’ of national territory by weakening Paris, dispersing
a large part of its population and moving most of its industries to the rest of the country.
French planning has relied on this argument for 50 years. Gravier’s concepts are still taught
in French planning schools and used by agencies. The image of ‘
 
Paris and the French desert
 
’
is quoted widely by geographers to describe the French territory, although experience has
shown that most of them have not even read Gravier’s book. [2]
 
Figure 1. Title page of Gravier’s book, Paris and the French desert
 
 (third edition, 1972).Armin Meili was a Swiss–German architect, planner and politician. Famous for his archi-
tectural works (notably, the Swiss Centre in Milan and the 
 
Kunst-und Kongresshaus
 
 in
Lucerne), he is also recognized as the author of the first national concept of planning in
Switzerland in an article published in 1933. [3] He went on to play a central role at the
beginning of Swiss planning institutions. In 1941, as a Member of Parliament (
 
Nazional
Rat
 
), he tabled a ‘motion’ for launching a national and a regional planning policy (
 
Landes-
und Regionalplanung
 
). In 1942, he became Director of the new Commission for National
Planning (
 
Landesplanungskommission
 
) and, the year after, the first director of the Swiss
Association for National Planning (
 
Schweizerische Vereinigung für Landesplanung)
 
. This
association gathered together most of the public communities in Switzerland (
 
Confédéra-
tion
 
, 
 
Cantons
 
, 
 
Communes
 
) and still exists today. He was also director of 
 
The Swiss
National Exhibition
 
 in Zurich in 1939 (Fig. 2). Owing to this position, he was showered
with praise and became a national figure.
 
Figure 2. Armin Meili during the construction of the Swiss National Exhibition of 1939 in Zürich (source: H. Meili and T. Enzmann, Armin Meili. Homo universalis helveticus, einer Ausstellung
 
. Luzern, Zurich: Katalog, 1983, p. 13).Armin Meili published articles only in Swiss professional journals (
 
Bauzeitung
 
 and
 
Bulletin technique de la Suisse romande
 
) and in the daily press (
 
Neue Zurcher Zeitung
 
). His
writings and lectures were devoted to promote the necessity of regional planning among
architects and to popularize planning ideas among the Swiss population. He is certainly less
known internationally than Gravier, but he is one the great names in the Swiss history of
town and country planning.
These two important theorists share their hostility towards the big city even if Gravier
decried one great city (Paris) whilst Meili blamed great cities in general. They also had a very
deep and lasting influence on regional planning in their countries.
Gravier declared his hatred of Paris: 
 
In all domains, the Paris agglomeration has behaved since 1850, not as a metropolis giving
life to its hinterland, but as a monopolist group devouring the substance of the nation. Its
action has multiplied the effects of the first industrial revolution and sterilized most provin-
cial economies by depriving them of their dynamic elements. Decision centres, conception
centres, and rare services: Paris has appropriated for itself all these leading activities and has
left only subordinate ones to the rest of France. Such absolute dependence is the very charac-
teristic of a colonial rule (p. 60).
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Figure 2. Armin Meili during the construction of the Swiss National Exhibition of 1939 in Zürich
(source: H. Meili and T. Enzmann, Armin Meili. Homo universalis helveticus, einer Ausstellung.
Luzern, Zurich: Katalog, 1983, p. 13).
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He also noted: 
 
Parisians, however, live in increasingly bad conditions in this megalopolis, which is crum-
bling under its gigantic weight; other Frenchmen have viewed it with fascination, then with
hostility, even with anger; the rest of the world feels less and less attraction to the “City of
Lights”. The loss of Paris as a world city is a phenomenon everybody can observe since 1960
(p. 121).
 
Meili (1943, p. 98) [4] recommended aggressive action by the State against urbaniza-
tion: ‘There are too many city dwellers … It is the general health of our people that
suffers. Lawmakers must fight, with all means available, against the invasion of land by
cities’.
The main common message of both writers is that growth of urbanization, development
of big agglomerations and, generally, urbanism (as a way of life) constitute a danger for the
health and the morality of the individual, the coherence of the family, the strength and the
well-being of a country.
 
Denouncing the city
 
Like Janus, the city has always been a divinity with two faces. Throughout Western culture,
the growth of cities has been accompanied by anti-urban thoughts, [5] the counterpoint of
ideologies which heralded the city as the privileged focus of human culture, progressive life
and liberty. In the eighteenth century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau lashed violently against big
cities and repeated previous attacks: ‘Cities are the abyss of the human species. After a few
generations, races die or degenerate. They need to be refreshed, and it is always the country-
side which furnishes replenishment’. [6]
It is not surprising to find old traditional criticisms in the texts of Meili and Gravier. What
is rather odd, however, is to find them, along with new arguments, repeating accusations
from earlier periods in connection with the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, even though
most urban conditions had changed drastically by then.
TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO THE CITY
With less talent and no more proof, both Gravier and Meili repeated Jean-Jacques Rous-
seau’s eighteenth century attacks against the city: that the city’s sterility absorbs and
destroys the rural population, that human concentration is harmful to humankind, and that
men and women lose all their morality in city life, whilst the urban environment supports
humankind in an artificial environment far away from Nature.
Gravier linked French demographic stagnation during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, and particularly in the1930s, to the concentration of population in Paris: 
 
Congestion costs were also a factor of low demographic vitality in this period [between the
two world wars] translated in huge human losses inflicted on France by the low birth rate in
Paris. “Big cities are the tombstones of the race”, wrote Alfred Sauvy [a French demographer
and colleague of Gravier] (p. 59).
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The author implied, but without proving it, that concentration caused the low birth rate,
whereas this phenomenon was more likely to be explained by the fact that liberated women
in big cities were in a better position to control their fertility. Furthermore, Gravier neglected
to compare death rates which were much lower in Paris, where good public health facilities
existed, with those in the countryside where death rates were worsened by alcoholism. The
argument is interesting, however: we find it also in Meili’s texts. Gravier, like Meili, used old
arguments out of context.
Overcrowding was also strongly criticized by Gravier as a cause for excessive costs: ‘Such
overcrowding [in Paris] brings on a constant inflation of unitary costs’. The author,
however, made no attempt to evaluate these costs and made no mention of economies of
scale. He did not even try to compare both costs and savings to suggest a balance.
Unlike Gravier, Meili did not try to give any scientific appearance to his arguments.
Rather, he positioned himself at a moral and general level, founding his criticisms on the
general argument that nothing good could emerge from urban concentration. When the
city reaches a certain level, it becomes harmful to human beings: ‘Everywhere where too
many people live together, we observe strikes, unemployment, diseases, famine and
pauperism. The more a space supports a dense population, the more fragile its economy
is’ (1942, p. 272).
He believed that, on the contrary, limited human settlements are favourable to individual
blossoming. He claimed that most famous men in history, like Dante, Michel-Angelo,
Leonardo da Vinci, Bach, Mozart, Schiller, were not native from metropolises but from little
towns. In this strange argument, he did not quote, however, great Roman and Greek men
who lived in what could be considered very big cities in that time.
Gravier and Meili insisted at length on the sterility of the big city, an argument well
developed before, in particular by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Meili declared that in big cities,
families disappeared after four generations if no new blood came from the countryside. [7]
Interestingly enough, the same worthless argument was used by Nazi geographers. [8]
Gravier wrote: 
 
These percentages show that Paris inflation coincides with a weakening of national demo-
graphic energy: during the first period, France gained 3 214 000 inhabitants; during the
second, only 1 200 000. Such decline, which goes on until 1945, forms a dangerous contrast
with the expansion of neighbouring nations (p. 35).
 
It is worth noticing that the author indicated only a ‘coincidence’, but did not, and could
hardly, prove a causal relationship between city growth and fertility decline. By juxtaposing
the two phenomena, however, Gravier implied strongly that the first is the cause of the
second, a dubious causal relationship that one finds more often in political pamphlets than
in scientific texts, which Meili also used quite often.
Gravier again underlined the difference of demographic regimes: ‘Three years later, World
War witnesses a new increase of population in Paris of 362 000 inhabitants while the rest of
France lost 2 631 000 persons (1911–21). Never was the contradiction between Parisian
inflation and national interest so blatantly obvious’.
Of course, the loss of 1 550 000 French soldiers and civilians killed in the war had a
dramatic influence. As for its population increase, the growth of war industries in the
capital, at a crucial proximity to the centre of the front line, may be explained easily.
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Both authors defended the ‘family’ as the very basis of a society that they saw endangered
by urban promiscuity. Most enemies of big cities have described these as the centre of all
vices. Gravier did not indulge deeply in such criticism, but he could not help noticing: ‘The
closer one comes to the city centre, the more unfit are housing and human environments for
a normal family to blossom’ (p. 6).
He did not define what a ‘normal family’ was. In fact, his model was the small (two
adults, two or three children) family typical of the European bourgeoisie during the nine-
teenth century, but very different from large peasant and noble families in earlier centuries.
Gravier, wishing a return to the 
 
Ancien Régime
 
 before the French Revolution (see below),
lamented the predicament of city women who could not take sufficient care of their own
children. He forgot that until the end of eighteenth century, rich and noble families usually
did not raise their children themselves: they entrusted them to wet nurses, sent them to reli-
gious schools and seminaries, and finally married their girls when they were still adolescent
or bought their sons a position in the army.
For Meili, cities were obviously not a very good place to raise children. ‘We all know how
the children grow up in the courtyards’, he claimed in 1942 (p. 272). Morality can only
prosper in a small community. Meili believed in the basic primacy of family relations. The
village was the ideal place where families live in harmony, where inhabitants knew each
other and where everybody was interested in the destiny of their neighbours. Conscientious
work by the farmer in the fields or by the craftsman was the best way to draw people away
from the immorality of the metropolis. Individual freedom from moral control and tradi-
tional prejudices did not seem to interest him. He was notably shocked by his journey to
Paris: ‘I was repulsed by Paris, as by a wonderful woman whose sinful attraction frightened
me. I had already noticed that behind a marvellously unheard-of stage, misery, corruption
and vice played fully their role’. [9]
The uprooted nature of city dwellers is a century-old topic: people away from their native
land are supposed to be prone to all possible forms of personal despair and social degenera-
tion. Here, again, Gravier fell into anachronism: in the middle of the twentieth century, the
majority of Parisian dwellers were born in the Paris agglomeration or in other big cities.
Quoting it, but without explaining his views, Gravier used the old organic paradigm
already well developed by the Romantics: ‘A human community forms an organism of
biological nature; it must be considered, basically, as a living body …. It is necessary to
insure the circulation of life over the whole of the national territory’ (p. 146).
In his first edition, Gravier relied completely on the organic image: ‘France is slowly dying
… France is a living being … we should look at her with physician’s eyes. Health of a living
being is not necessarily expressed by his weight’ (1947, p. 24). Gravier tried to show that
population concentration was dangerous because it would ‘clog’ national life. The organic
paradigm was widely used as a conservative image of society, in opposition to the quite
mechanical concept of class struggle. An organism is defined as ‘an individual having …
parts that function together as a whole to maintain life and its activities’. [10] In this way,
unity of the diverse whole is ensured and each part must work and be satisfied at its own
place. Here, again, no justification is given to sustain the very doubtful hypothesis of a
nation as a living organism. The paradigm is extremely conservative and nationalistic. The
national border is presented as a natural membrane separating nations as distinct living
cells.
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Often very allusive, Meili made references to the ‘organic necessity of planning’ or the
‘inorganic way’ transportation networks were built (1943, pp. 96–7). For the Swiss architect,
cities must have a ‘natural’ shape inspired by Nature. ‘Like a too fat body that suffocates the
natural working of the organs, such a construction (the big cities chaos) suffocates the
spiritual and corporal development of city dwellers. It is the absurd action of the big city’
(1941, p. 4).
MODERN CRITICISM
Quite naturally, the criticisms of the city borrowed by our authors from nineteenth
century literature dealt more with the industrial revolution and its social and political
effects.
 
Cities are socially and politically dangerous.
 
One of the strongest bases for hating the city,
since 1850, has been social fear in France, in particular, where so many political and social
revolutions developed in Paris during the nineteenth century. For partisans of the old soci-
ety, big cities have always been considered as hotbeds of revolutionaries, unionists, strikers
and other troublemakers.
In Switzerland, there was a general strike in 1918, the only one the country has ever
known. Before that, several strikes had taken place in different cities as a consequence of
lack of supplies. The social movement of 1918 took place especially in cities such as Zurich,
Basel and Bern. The opposition between town and country was stirred up on those occa-
sions as soldiers coming from the countryside were sent against urban workers, in the same
way that 35 000 Parisians were massacred by French troops composed of peasants during
the Commune of May 1871. For the historian François Walter, those strikes represented a
real trauma in Swiss political consciousness: ‘The image of peasants and mountain dwellers
ready to defend their country against urban revolutionary workers found strong bases in
those incidents’. [11]
For Meili, crime, the proletariat and civil insurrection prosper together, far away from
nature in the excessive density and overcrowding of cities. ‘Urban concentration produces
proletariat and criminals’ and ‘Too high a concentration of workers is a source of civil
commotion’ (1943, p. 96).
Once more, concentration was considered not as an effect but as a powerful cause of
social phenomena which could, in this convenient way, be neglected. Meili feared what he
called ‘masses’. He read Gustave le Bon and Jose Ortega y Gasset. [12] Those theorists
considered that people were altered when grouped in crowds and, eventually, regressed to a
primary state of humanity. Subscribing to those theses, Meili condemned big cities as places
where masses prosper and where humans lose their freedom.
Gravier contented himself with some allusions: ‘More, however, than this quite normal
increase of the tertiary sector, the main phenomenon is the appearance of a true “army” of
industry workers among the firms in Paris suburbs’ (p. 45). The word ‘army’ is used here as
a frightening image. Although the danger of social upheaval seemed to have been much
smaller in Switzerland, Meili was apparently more frightened. He was not the only one. One
of the first goals of Swiss federal planning during the Second World War was to purge the
city of its ‘dangerous’ populations. [13]
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Cities are unhealthy.
 
For Gravier, the Paris environment was unhealthy, even deadly.
Surprisingly, however, he did not raise the issue of pollution anywhere in his book, even in
the 1972 edition, at a time when ecological ideas began to circulate widely in France. Typi-
cally, he seemed interested mainly in moral issues (low fertility of Parisian women) and
political criticism (excessive centralization of power).
For Meili, big cities were not a healthy place to live. They created obstacles to the action
of the sun and were noisy. Meili was more concerned than Gravier by pollution. His criti-
cisms concerning hygiene in cities went a bit further. It was the general health of the Swiss
people that suffered from the development of urban agglomerations. Bad conditions in cities
were responsible not only for physical but also for mental diseases: ‘Many forms of degener-
acy, with nervous troubles and mental damage, are the product of the uproarious life in big
cities’ (1945, p. 5).
Because life in great cities is not ‘natural’, under such conditions people must deteriorate
physically, mentally and eventually morally. Meili used the word 
 
Entartungskrankheiten
 
(decadence diseases): an expression which was very common in the National–Socialist
propaganda.
Maybe because of their background and certainly because of their belief in authori-
tarian planning, both authors neglected economic and particularly market mechanisms
and sometimes seemed to ignore them completely. Gravier considered the land market
only to propose a drastic change in the permitted housing density in the Paris agglom-
eration and, as a consequence, to overturn the whole land price system. He seemed to
believe that salaries depended on the free decision of employers; he ignored econo-
mies of scale and minimized the role of transportation costs. He never discussed
public finances, nor did he try to see where the resources of the national state came
from. Had he done this, he would have had to acknowledge that the six main French
agglomerations filled the national Treasury and that the rest of the country was
largely subsidized.
 
Cities devour resources.
 
With great force, Meili criticized capitalism and, of course, ‘land
speculation’ without defining the term clearly. The cost of living is much higher in big
cities, particularly with respect to administrative costs and farm products. Meili failed,
however, to indicate that the high prices of farm products were due to customs duty and
high subsidies on farm products.
He justified his criticism of speculation by patriotism: the soil is the nation and the nation
cannot be left in the hands of ‘speculators’. Similar criticisms were extremely frequent in
Nazi literature. [14] His criticisms recall the violence with which Godfried Feder, a famous
architect and planner in Germany, condemned lending at interest as ‘usury’, a practice he
wanted to eradicate with the creation of a popular movement to solve the German housing
crisis in the 1920s. [15] Gravier was less outspoken but he also criticized land speculation,
particularly in Paris, of course. He proposed to break it down by drastically reducing demo-
graphic concentration and land prices, in the hope of ruining the hated Parisian bourgeoisie
in this way.
Both writers seemed to pursue a search for a ‘third way’ based on nationalism, which
would not suffer an excess of individualism like Capitalism, or a frightening community rule
and atheistic background like Bolshevism. Such a ‘third way’ was typical of the different
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forms of fascism that appeared in Europe with Mussolini, Hitler, Pétain, Franco and
Salazar.
THE SAME ART OF SOPHISTRY
Many unsubstantiated statements were introduced by Gravier, particularly in his last edition
(1972), with the same words: ‘A mindful scrutiny shows that’ or ‘A careful examination
proves that’. Meili did similarly, writing: ‘Experience proves that’. Both used connotations
of words rather than their precise definition, which allowed them to state without any effort
of proof. Both spoke of ‘immoderate’ urban sizes, of ‘excessive’ growth, of urban ‘cancers’
‘devouring’ the countryside, of villages at a ‘human scale’ without defining the excess or
justifying their criticisms.
An impressive example of sophism, among many, may be found in Gravier: 
 
Because, in order to recruit the hundreds of thousands of migrants necessary to its expansion
[of the Paris agglomeration], the capital city has kept offering relatively high salaries: in
1938, a printer receives 11.90 F an hour in Paris and 6.87 F, on average, in other French
towns (p. 57).
 
Figures are suspect: Sauvy, in his famous 
 
Histoire économique de la France entre les deux
guerres
 
, gave contradictory evidence. [16] But let us accept Gravier’s. There are only three
explanations to the phenomenon Gravier claimed to observe: 
1. productivity was approximately the same in all French cities but Parisian firms paid
more probably because they were more constrained by trades unions than in smaller
cities where workers were left to themselves;
2. firms could not pay more and Parisian businessmen were philanthropic verging on
bankruptcy, a quite unlikely explanation;
3. productivity was much higher in Paris than elsewhere [17] and businessmen could pay
higher salaries and obtain simultaneously higher profits. The latter was definitely the
answer but it was contrary to everything that Gravier wanted to demonstrate.
In the same way, Meili wrote: ‘Urban transformations require the same expenditure as a
war’ (1943, p. 97), a quite meaningless statement when it is devoid of any precision, but a
very impressive one none the less. Not surprisingly, Gravier used the same method.
Evaluating in a very crude way the births that did not occur in the Paris agglomeration as a
result of a falling birth rate, he compared in a bizarre way the effect of declining natural
increase with the number of men and women killed during World War II: 
 
So, some 885 000 young people might be estimated as the price Paris has cost the nation in
15 years. Such a loss is higher than losses due to World War II, since the excess of deaths
over births is estimated at 650 000 for the period 1939–1946 (p. 60).
 
The reader may wonder why World War II is supposed to go from 1939 to 1946, when it
was actually over in May 1945 and the French territory was liberated at the end of 1944.
The reason is simple: 1946 was the year of the peak of the baby-boom, when many more
births were registered than many other years in the twentieth century, thereby converging a
much higher and more impressive result to Gravier’s computation.
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Gravier’s and Meili’s ideas: the contexts
 
It is not known if Gravier and Meili met each other or even read each other’s publica-
tions. Quite surprisingly, however, both authors developed similar ideas in quite different
environments.
VERY DIFFERENT CONTEXTS …
Meili and Gravier belonged to two different countries with different territories, cultures,
histories, economic developments, governments, etc. In the 1940s, when Meili wrote his
papers and Gravier published the first edition of 
 
Paris et le désert français
 
, three main
characteristics, apart from size, distinguished France from Switzerland.
First, France was a very centralized state, following absolute traditions laid down by kings
and emperors. On the contrary, Switzerland was a federal state where different entities
(
 
cantons
 
) had most of the power. Except for the duration of World War II, when the federal
government concentrated exceptional power in its own hands. The Confederation used
those circumstances to set up the first elements of town and country planning policy.
Secondly, whilst France relied on representative government, direct democracy, as empha-
sized by Meili was a typical feature of the political Swiss system. Thirdly, France suffered
intense destruction during the five years’ war: 635 000 persons were killed and 20% of all
buildings, 80% of harbours and 50% of railway lines were destroyed. Some cities (Brest,
Royan, Saint-Malo) practically disappeared from the map. The country needed everything:
steel, coal, gas, electricity and food; ration tickets were still in use in 1947 and the winter of
1945 had been the worst of the whole period. The need for planning was so obvious that a
country where the state did not play much of an economic role before 1939 became an
example of national planning. In 1946, the 
 
Plan Monnet
 
 (named after Jean Monnet) created
a national planning organization in charge of centralizing information, defining priorities
and organizing collaboration between administrations, businessmen, specialists and unions.
This was a completely new concept. Unlike France, Switzerland suffered no destruction:
reconstruction was not an issue on Swiss territory. Swiss society, however, had to face some
consequences of the war: supply problems, social tension and housing shortage. [18] The
food supply problem was a central topic in Meili’s negative vision of cities: they were, of
course, not self-sufficient.
Just before the war, the relationship between industrialization and urbanization had
distinctive and almost contrasting features in France and Switzerland (Table 1). Switzerland
had a strong industrial sector but no big urban concentration, whilst agriculture remained
the dominant feature in France. In 1941, only 30% of the population in Switzerland lived in
a city of more than 10 000 inhabitants. [19] The supposed ‘horrors’ of big cities were very
much theoretical in Switzerland when Meili wrote his texts. Urban growth in Switzerland
during that period was nothing like urbanization in France or England. In 1930, London
had 8.2 million inhabitants (rising to 10.3 million in 1950), and Paris 5.6 million inhabit-
ants (rising to 6.0 million in 1950): Zurich, the biggest city in Switzerland at that time, had
only 390 000 inhabitants in 1934. [20]
Meili advocated direct and local democracy, while Gravier praised the 
 
Ancien Régime
 
, a
supposedly balanced system of powers and privileges that existed in France before 1789.
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This desire to restore a monarchical system became the basic thesis of the far-right national-
ist movement 
 
Action Française
 
. Surprisingly enough, in spite of such deep differences,
Meili’s and Gravier’s theses converge strongly.
… BUT SURPRISINGLY COMMON IDEAS
Two main political and cultural trends seemed to have influenced their ideas and orientated
them in the same direction.
 
The strength of ruralism.
 
Gravier’s and Meili’s ideas on cities were inseparable from a
political and cultural context of rural life idealization and city discrediting. The movement
was very old but it took its main course as more and more men were leaving the country
life. It really began in the eighteenth century, with Romanticism and reached its peak at the
beginning of the twentieth century.
As shown by Anne-Marie Thiesse, [21] rural life idealization was a constant trend in all
European nations since they built a national identity. It took its place among the great myths
that cemented nations. Meili and Gravier used ideas touching on a subject close to a nation’s
heart.
Swiss national identity was developed outside the cities, using ideal representations of
nature and villages in the Alps. This Alps myth was mainly constructed by writers of the
eighteenth century, such as Albrecht de Haller or Rousseau. They described an ideal life in
Swiss mountains, inhabited by ‘Bons sauvages’, contrasting with the malign mutation of life
in big cities.
One great moment of expression of national identity was the National Swiss Exhibition.
In 1896, in Geneva, a Swiss Village was created to represent the nation. It was built with
examples of rural architecture chosen from all over the country and took place in an artifi-
cial countryside landscape with mountains, torrents, real cows, real farmers and craftsmen.
This kind of Village was again reproduced in 1914 in Bern and in 1939 in Zurich as well as
in other international exhibitions (Paris 1900, Glasgow 1903). For generations, the Swiss
Village represented the central figure of national imagery. [22] In 1939, under the influence
of Armin Meili, director of the exhibition, the Village became the symbol of ‘National
 
Table 1. Industry and urbanization 
 
c
 
. 1930
Countries
Industry as % of total 
employment
Population in towns of less 
than 10 000 inhabitants (%)
Population in towns of more 
than 50 000 inhabitants (%)
France 35.1 60.4 26.1
Switzerland 44.9 67.1 21.5
Great Britain 48.1 27.3 52.8
Germany 40.6 50.8 35.4
Source: C. Brüschweiler, Industrialisierung und Verstädterung in der Schweiz. 
 
Die Schweiz als Kleinstaat in der
Weltwirtschaft
 
. St. Gall: Fehr, 1945, pp. 328, 333 (quoted in A. Rossi, 
 
La décentralisation urbaine en Suisse
 
.
Lausanne: PPUR, 1983, p. 29).
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Defence’ in the threat of the war period. People should find in this rural place the expression
of the Swiss resistance.
In Switzerland, as in France, the period between the two world wars was characterized by
an idealization of rural life in literature, politics and the economy. [23] Meili and Gravier
belonged to a trend running from the eighteenth century until the early twentieth century
that despised industry and suggested that national strength was rooted in agriculture. The
 
Physiocrats
 
 [24] in the eighteenth century divided society into three parts: the 
 
productive
class
 
, i.e. the peasants who produce all of society’s wealth; the 
 
landed class
 
 whose members
help them by investing in land; and the rest of the nation, grouped in a 
 
sterile class
 
 of ‘para-
sites’ and including all city dwellers. During the Second World War, Pétain claimed that
peasants and craftsmen constituted the cement of the new social and economic order; [25]
he promoted a ‘back to the land’ policy.
In Switzerland, agriculture has been a very protected activity since the end of the nine-
teenth century. During the two world wars, its place was consolidated. [26] Agriculture
allowed the country to survive and contributed to national defence. In the meantime, the city
appeared like an interior enemy. Ernst Laur, creator and president of the powerful Swiss
Farmers’ Union, claimed in 1940: ‘Two dangers threaten the country, first the war, and
second, the growth of urbanisation and industrialisation. Both irreparably lead the Swiss
people to quantitative and qualitative weakening’. [27]
People’s relationship to rurality was a central topic in Meili’s theory against the city. First,
because distance between people and land, caused by concentration and urban sprawl,
makes it difficult to maintain supplies chains. Secondly, and above all, this distance turns
people away from the ‘mother country’. In big cities, the ancestral community disappears
into anonymity, collective disinterest and bad morality. In that context, Meili simply forgot
or ignored the socio-economic functions of a city. For instance, in 1943 he suggested build-
ing cities away from main roads, in quieter places, [28] a most surprising concept that he did
not justify.
This is where Gravier seemed quite at odds with Meili, since he spent more time criticizing
Paris than advocating ruralism, farmers’ privileges or agricultural subsidies. But, enthused
by the ideology of the Vichy regime, he wrote: 
 
Shapeless and inhuman agglomerations born too quickly from industrial concentration,
faceless and joyless cities where streets are all the same … proletarian cities, i.e. without any
heritage, are as many losses of national substance … Our cities want to consume the
surrounding ring of land … We will awaken the country by rebuilding France’s human,
social, economical equilibrium. Tens, hundreds of cantons wait to be colonized … Then there
would not be any more isolated, exhausted communes that do not know each other and look
with boredom and envy to Paris …’. [29]
 
Gravier’s attachment to rural France was clear, even if his main goal was to destroy Paris.
More anti-urban than pro-rural, he seems particularly interested in defending middle-sized
cities from the attraction of the ‘monster’ of Paris. In her very interesting doctoral work,
Isabelle Provost even defended the thesis that developing regional cities at the expense of
Paris was behind Gravier’s policy. [30] She believed that it was also at the expense of rural
areas, for which the DATAR (
 
Délégation à l’Aménagement du Territoire et à l’Action
Régionale
 
) [31] seemed to have had little concern. This is to forget, however, that over the
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last 40 years, the French Ministry of Agriculture has been in the hands of the main farmers’
union, the FNSEA (
 
Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d’Exploitants Agricoles
 
), [32] some-
times with the president of that union as Minister. The regular annual flow of public
subsidies to agriculture has been estimated to be some 30 billion euros, [33] hardly proof of
neglect. Most of the money came from taxes levied in big cities, which deprived the capital
city of resources and its suburbs of facilities and thereby indirectly made Gravier’s dream
come true. The extraordinary success of Gravier’s book can be explained only by the
strength, even the passion of such ruralist feelings in an ageing France and particularly in the
‘
 
Province
 
’.
 
Planning to solve crises in a reactionary environment.
 
Between the two world wars, Europe
bore the harsh legacy of the First World War. Exhausted by resulting misery and destruc-
tion, it experienced disastrous inflation (particularly in Germany, in order to cancel the
enormous debts incurred during the conflict at the expense of a largely destroyed middle-
class) and, finally, a huge depression originating in the USA in 1930–1. Two frightening
political currents swept over Europe: fascism in Italy, then Germany and finally Spain,
Portugal and partly in Poland; and Bolshevism in Russia. Neither France nor Switzerland
had a fascist government. Meili’s and Gravier’s ideas, however, were inseparable from such
ideological trends.
As a politician, Meili was a member of the traditional right wing (
 
der Freisinnigen Partei
Zürichs
 
) but his intellectual background was very close to fascist ideologies. This was the
thesis developed in 1997 by Charles Linsmayer, an editor at the Bern daily, ‘
 
Der Bund
 
’. [34]
Linsmayer produced many quotations showing convincingly that Meili’s ideas coincided
with the ‘blood and soil’ pathos of German National Socialism and Italian Fascism. In his
1954 autobiography, Meili branded communists, socialists and all left-wing attitudes as
unpatriotic and enemies. Foreigners, non-Aryans, Jews and even artists were always suspect
to him, while real Swiss people were considered as a pure race. Meili was himself convinced
that he came from pure ‘Aryan blood’. His picture of women was also reactionary. Any
woman who was defiled and lacked a silky blond body, could be described by the director of
the National Swiss exhibition as ‘carrion’, ‘vampire’ or ‘unattractive old maid’. His autobi-
ography shows also that Meili, a non-commissioned officer, had great admiration for the
military, especially the German army. [35] Clean, orderly and ideologically uniform, that is
how Armin Meili saw his ideal Switzerland.
Like Meili, Gravier had many contacts with fascist ideologies. In 
 
Paris and le désert
français
 
, he quoted frequently and with admiration Pierre Gaxotte who was a historian and
leader of ‘Action Française’, a very right-wing and monarchical movement, and editor of the
anti-Semitic journals ‘
 
Je suis Partout
 
’ and ‘
 
La Gerbe
 
’. [36] Gaxotte supported the collabora-
tion of Pétain with the Nazis.
A first source for Gravier was ‘planisme’. Between the wars, this quite powerful move-
ment was developed among the French elites: it was anti-democratic, considering elected
officials at the best incompetent, at the worst corrupt. This opinion was reinforced by a few
big scandals (notably the Prince Stavisky affair which brought down the government in
1934) used by the extreme-right against the Parliament. A small but powerful group, ‘X-
Crise’, was constituted by engineers of the famous ‘Ecole Polytechnique’. Under the
leadership of Albert, they prepared a quite comprehensive set of plans [37] to change French
 Anti-urban ideologies and planning in France and Switzerland
 
43
economy and society radically. ‘Planisme’ found strong arguments from the Great
Depression and in the examples of Roosevelt, Hitler and Stalin.
The second source of Gravier’s doctrine was to be found in the writings of Charles
Maurras who created ‘
 
l’Action Française
 
’ (1898–9
 
)
 
. Maurras developed three main ideas.
(1) The family is all-important, not the individual; a child is nothing at his birth but inherits
centuries of culture and owes everything to his family and his nation, which is nothing but ‘a
family of families’. (2) The village, the small town, the region are the only efficient
environments for education and life. (3) Tradition is everything: man’s duty is to receive
traditions with respect and to transmit them to his children in order to preserve nation’s
‘land and blood’. Migrants, foreigners, footloose people and particularly Jews, are all
decadent beings and enemies. Large cities are thus the cause and example of everything evil:
‘Like a fish rotting from its head, France is perverted and weakened by the excessive power
of Paris’. [38]
Both Meili and Gravier share in common a great admiration for the work of Alexis
Carrel. Meili quoted him at the very moment (1942, p. 272) when Gravier was working
in Carrel’s organization in France. This common admiration is very telling: Alexis Carrel
received the Nobel Prize for Medicine in 1932. His main book [39] achieved an enormous
success on both sides of the Atlantic. He created a foundation (1936) in the USA in order
to advance the ‘bettering of human race’. A great admirer of French fascists such as La
Roque and Doriot, and a member of the pro-Nazi Doriot’s party, Carrel brought his
foundation to occupied France [40] with the help of Pétain’s government. Gravier worked
in this foundation as Director of the Centre for Regional Synthesis. Carrel hated cities as
much as Meili and Gravier: ‘Modern society … is making the same mistake as all civilisa-
tions in Antiquity: it is creating life conditions where the survival of the individual and of
its race become impossible’ (Preface to 
 
Man, the Unknown
 
). For Carrel, the individual
depends heavily on the environment, which explains an idealization of rural life or
contact with Nature that is found in the texts of Gravier’s and, to a greater extent, of
Meili.
This coincidence of anti-urbanism and fascist thought is not surprising. Reactionary
governments in the 1930–40s, in Fascist Italy, National–Socialist Germany and Vichy
France were built on an anti-urban ideology. [41] Quite evidently, Meili and Gravier were
impressed by theories developed by the Nazi regime: the national-socialist programme
prepared by Gottfried Feder [42] in 1932 advocated the ‘de-urbanization’ of Germany (
 
Die
Verstädterung Deutschlands
 
). In those regimes, racism and anti-Semitism were juxtaposed
with anti-urbanism; the ‘blood and soil’ pathos coincided with idealization of the country-
side. As places of cosmopolitanism, free expression and individual emancipation, big cities
could not suit reactionary regimes based upon national identity, authoritarian decision-
making and collective actions.
 
Similar propositions
 
In spite of having such different backgrounds, Gravier and Meili shared the same beliefs, the
same hates and the same myths. Meili’s and Gravier’s arguments are based on four main
myths.
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THE MYTH OF ‘REGIONAL EQUILIBRIUM’
Both advocated ‘regional balance’: it was their main goal, repeated over and over again.
Meili’s ideal representation of urbanization was a balanced distribution of small cities all
over the territory (‘urban decentralization’). He proposed the creation of a large decentral-
ized metropolis in Switzerland (
 
weit dezentralisierte Grossstadt Schweiz
 
) between Lake
Constance and Lake Geneva (Lac Léman) (1942, p. 273).
This option of territorial development, first developed in Switzerland by Meili, has influ-
enced and still influences Swiss planning policy. In 1973, the first national Town and Coun-
try Planning schedule [43] presented a model of urbanization where the growth of the five
big centres of Switzerland (Geneva, Lausanne, Basel, Bern and Zurich) would be halted to
the benefit of eight smaller centres (Bienne-Neuchâtel, Aarau-Olten, Lucerne, Saint-Gall,
Fribourg, Sion-Sierre, Belinzona-Lugano, Coire) and other medium and smaller cities. The
main principle was ‘concentrated decentralization’ of the economy and urban growth based
on a well-delimitated network of cities. This national plan has not been confirmed in law;
none the less many cantons have used the principle for their own regional development in
the 1970s and 1980s. [44]
Geographer Jean-Luc Piveteau [45] noticed that the ‘concentrated decentralization’ princi-
ple, even if inefficient as a global planning strategy, had the immense advantage of being
widely and easily accepted because it fitted particularly well with the Swiss political system:
a federation of autonomous cantons. ‘Regional equilibrium’, whatever that may mean,
sounds attractive because it makes regional development coincide with the Swiss system,
based on a fair distribution of power between confederation, cantons and communes. In
practice, however, this model has had no influence. As Piveteau noted sarcastically, ‘it was
up against strong opponents: globalisation of the economy and the new international
division of labour, trends manifestly breaking with the Christaller vision of a city network ’
[46] which was the very basis of Meili’s model.
‘Regional balance’ does not have the same meaning in very centralized France where the
DATAR has been the principal instrument for implementing Gravier’s objectives. By a
decree dated 14 February 1963, the government created this 
 
délégation
 
, the main institution
in charge of territorial planning in France, answering directly to the Prime Minister. [47] Its
goal is to co-ordinate spatially (or horizontally) the actions of Ministries that are
accustomed to deal with economic sectors (vertically). The main goal is ‘To re-establish the
equilibrium of national territory’, but the equilibrium of what: production, population,
wealth, equipment? In fact, the main, if not only goal, taken from Gravier’s book, is to
weaken Paris: ‘The goal was to counterbalance the attraction of the Paris agglomeration and
to foster a faster growth of several regional capital cities’. [48]
Neither Meili nor Gravier, however, describe precisely what they mean by this eye-
catching expression: ‘regional balance’. Does it represent a more even income distribution
for all, similar public investments in different regions or equal distribution of population
over the national territory? Such different conceptions are obviously contradictory. Both
authors fail to offer any justification or even any discussion of these fuzzy concepts which
they convert into national goals. Isabelle Provost asks: 
 
But why should there be a regional balance? Why could we not imagine rationally 55 million
people concentrated in Paris and the rest of France given back to Nature? Such a statement is
 Anti-urban ideologies and planning in France and Switzerland
 
45
 
not absurd. The only arguments against it would be ecological (pollution due to an excessive
concentration) or economic (excessive cost of big agglomerations). Such arguments, anyway,
could be easily opposed. [49]
 
One really wonders if the myth of ‘equal balance’ is not a way to designate a return to
earlier forms of economy, when France and Switzerland were almost exclusively agricultural
countries, with similar densities of population all over the land.
THE OPTIMAL SIZE OF THE CITY
To support their thesis on the necessity of regional equilibrium, both Gravier and Meili tried
to define an optimal size for a city, an endeavour which has long fascinated geographers but
without any success since they would have to define criteria for their judgement (optimal for
whom?). Also, optimal size would change with the view-point (economic, fiscal, social,
cultural), the people involved (optimal for the population or the enterprises?) and the period
in history. Such difficulties, however, did not stop our two authors from making quite
peremptory statements: ‘A careful examination allows us to estimate that the optimal size of
an agglomeration is always (sic) under two million people, whatever the value of its site’
(Gravier, p. 157).
Meili could not imagine the economic benefit of urban concentration because his theory
was based on his belief about the social and economic benefits of traditional life in a village.
As soon as a city reaches more than 30 000 inhabitants, he considers that it loses all the
economic benefits of village life: 
 
We cannot do without village forces, deriving from nature and from human exchange
between neighbours. Maintaining good relationships in the vicinity, knowing one’s neigh-
bours develops economic forces, too often disregarded. Such forces disappear as soon as a
city has more than 30 000 inhabitants (1942, p. 273).
 
Without quoting it, Meili gave almost the same evaluation as Ebenezer Howard whose
Garden City should not exceed 32 000 inhabitants. [50] When a Garden City has grown to
this size, it should then develop by fostering another Garden City beyond its own hinterland
until a cluster of Garden Cities comes into existence. Meili made the same proposal for the
growth of Swiss towns but used the term ‘satellite towns’ instead of ‘Garden Cities’ (1943,
p. 98).
HINTERLAND VERSUS CITIES, AREAS VERSUS NETWORKS: THE CHRISTALLER 
MYTH
Gravier conceived each city as the centre of a region where inhabitants bought and sold prod-
ucts and services. It might have industries, but only small ones, thanks to the ubiquity of
electrical energy. Each city has a hinterland corresponding to its size. Organized into a pyra-
mid, these cells form a nation. Nowhere in the first two editions of his book did Gravier quote
Christaller’s work but he used it in the third edition (1972) with obvious pleasure, to justify
his views. He did not take into account huge industrial and tertiary functions, typical of big
cities, which work not so much with the surrounding countryside but in networks that extend
beyond national borders. He did not hesitate to state a ‘law’ for the ‘right’ size of cities: 
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Cantons, counties, departments and regions will continue to be directed by an urban hierar-
chy, i.e. by a network of “central places”, according to the words of the German geographer
Christaller. One would like to establish a “law” whereby the critical mass of the central
nucleus would change from 20% of the total population in small administrative areas to
10% in the big ones (p. 153).
 
He felt compelled to add ‘But such a rule is not mathematical’ and further on : 
Experience shows that the influence of a metropolis or of a polycentric nervous system has an
impact up to 200 km at most, which corresponds to a two-hour trip by car, i.e. to the possi-
bility of driving to the centre and back during the day (p. 206).
The fact that transportation technology and average speed achieved on a network can
change much faster than an urban network did not seem to have attracted his attention.
In Meili’s vision of national territory, big urban concentrations have a negative impact on
the economy because they are over-dependent for their food supply on their agricultural
hinterland. Meili was certainly impressed by the social tensions and strikes linked with the
lack of food supplies during the First World War. For Meili, the international economic
importance of Swiss cities did not matter. He only emphasized their weaknesses because his
theory was built on the wartime principles of self-sufficiency in food supply. This is why he
deplored the existence of cities: ‘Life, even in partial self-sufficiency, is impossible in a city’
(1942, p. 272).
Christaller’s model, which is very famous nowadays in geography teaching, was not much
known in France before the 1960s. In Switzerland, it was probably used for the first time by
geographers in the late 1940s. [51] Meili might have known about this model but never
quoted it. The views of planning held by Meili and Gravier were, however, very close to the
model, for quite obvious reasons. Christaller built his scheme in the 1920s, in the most rural
part of Bavaria, at a time when cities were being intensely criticized all over Europe. He
envisaged cities as small capitals of rural territories where farmers came to sell and buy. The
economic basis of this system was an embedding of areas where cities depended ultimately
on agricultural production. Christaller himself was interested only in small towns (less than
20 000 inhabitants). [52] Areas of increasing size were piled up in an ‘urban pyramid’. In
sufficiently large regions, populations at different levels follow quite regularly the so-called
‘rank-size rule’: the population ratio from one level to another was constant. The capital city
at the summit should then have a population corresponding to the upper part of the pyra-
mid. From this viewpoint, Paris seemed too big for France, but Christaller and Gravier failed
to consider the importance of international activities. Big cities do not function simply as
centres in the middle of an agricultural area but as nodes within a network. The functions
and population of Paris depend much more on activities in London, Frankfurt, New York or
Tokyo than on the output of the agricultural land that surrounds the capital or on the
activity of small French towns.
To oppose ‘area models’ with ‘network models’ is to contrast traditional economies based
on agriculture with modern economies built on world-wide businesses, to oppose a narrow
national view of the functions of cities with that of international activities, and simply to
oppose land and city. Quite typically, Gravier and Meili, in spite of important differences in
the history and economies of France and Switzerland, were defending similar theses. Such
viewpoints were extremely nationalistic: the urban pyramid with its rural base is necessarily
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limited to the national territory. Nowhere did Gravier or Meili discuss the role and the
importance of international transactions. From the 1960s to the 1990s, the DATAR, largely
inspired by Gravier’s ideas, mapped France’s population and activities with a blank left for
Paris, which usually was not represented at all, and limited these activities to French
national borders, even though the Common Market, subsequently the European Union, was
in existence and played a significant role. It is still more surprising to observe the over-
importance accorded to the Swiss countryside by Swiss planning authorities and their
neglect of big cities when the major part of the Swiss economy is based on banking and
insurance activities located in these very cities (Zurich, Geneva, Basel) that planners do not
want to consider.
PLANNING AS A POWER DREAM
Meili advocated a very strong intervention of public authorities: ‘The lawmaker must fight
by any means against the invasion of land by cities’ (1943, p. 98). World War II gave him
the chance to dream about a very interventionist form of national planning (Landespla-
nung). Exceptional circumstances were an opportunity for the Swiss government to seize full
power. [53] However, the end of the war marked the end of this policy; both federalism and
the interest of private property acted as strong barriers to any national planning ambition.
[54] The first federal town and country planning law was voted only in 1979. Eventually,
each canton would set up its own legislation and practice concerning planning. Meili praised
highly the determination of authoritarian governments in the eighteenth century: the enlight-
ened despotism of Frederick II of Prussia was his model. He also admired the planned
morphology of cities, like Bern or Fribourg, made by authoritative governments in
Switzerland at the same time (1943, p. 97).
In a similar way, the Vichy regime represented the triumph of technocrats over representa-
tives of the people. The government gave power to high-level technocrats who enjoyed being
liberated from parliamentary control and political fuss. Planning, not elaborating laws,
could now become the main task. [55]
Regional planning was very popular in Europe before and after World War II. From the
right-wing point of view, the horrors of the Great Depression convinced many people of
the need for some rational control over economic phenomena; from the left wing, the
example of the Soviet Union had a powerful impact. Destruction and misery in 1940s
France were compounded in 1945 by bombing from the air and battles on French soil.
The scarcity of everything and the need to produce at all cost imposed planning as the
only solution.
Both authors defended a corporatist state and adopted a typically technocratic attitude:
Gravier saw the geographer as a ‘man of synthesis’ whose role was to co-ordinate the works
of specialists like economists, sociologists and geologists in order to produce the synthesis,
the ‘Plan’. Such a belief explains the quite incredible arrogance of Gravier’s detailed plan-
ning of the future organization of France without any consultation of population, unions,
businessmen, politicians or others.
Policies advocated by Gravier were strangely contradictory, to the point of being bizarre.
On one hand, Gravier wanted to demote Paris, which he considered too powerful and
centralized. On the other, he advocated a firm, even brutal, decentralization process that
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only the central State could perform. Isabelle Provost points out the paradox of French
planning which, following Gravier, aims at developing the periphery and controlling Paris
but from a very centralized policy position. [56]
According to Gravier, the only means of accomplishing such decentralization was,
through the naked authority of the central State. By devolving more power and means to
local authorities, he believed that this would weaken Paris. However, he did not realize that
such a policy would also be welcomed by a capital city which could then use its own wealth
rather than subsidizing the rest of France. Gravier was confusing the Paris agglomeration
with the central French government which is located in the city but whose policies and inter-
ests have almost always been opposed to those of the city. Paris would likely benefit from
such weakening of the national state.
While advocating local autonomy, Gravier proposed an extremely authoritarian organiza-
tion of the country, where land use, city size, functions and equipment would be centrally
planned and decided. Even a brutal and powerful regime like the Soviet government would
have hesitated to adopt such holistic and detailed planning. Gravier believed that Paris must
be, if not destroyed, then at least reduced in such a way that it would become just ‘one
eighty-third of France’ (the country then contained 83 départements). The policy should be
very brutal: 
The first decision would be a radical modification of the building code which, let us recall,
allows the construction of 30 000 m2, even 35 000 m2 on 1 hectare, against 13 200 m2 in the
suburbs and 10 000 m2 in big German cities. Such premium to over-saturation should be
immediately cancelled and the COS (Coefficient d’Occupation des Sols) [57] reduced to the
level of the suburban COS (p. 210).
Gravier seemed to be conscious of the enormous economic, fiscal and social consequences
of such a measure, but he believed that planners should not hesitate and should act firmly.
At no moment did he discuss the political and social opposition to his propositions and how
they might be overcome. He seemed to imply that a brutal, almost dictatorial regime, could
apply such policy and he regretted that such a regime did not exist in the past. But for the
future, he hoped that geographers would be able to plan everything and enjoy overwhelming
authority to do so (pp. 213 and 241).
Gravier advocated a fundamentally spatial vision of planning: a direct, mechanical and
univocal relationship between built-up space and social life. Meili exhibited the same beliefs:
‘I hope that I have demonstrated that the Swiss man, like any man, is moulded by the society
he is living in; he is shaped by his local environment’ (1942, p. 274).
As a consequence, planning is supposed to be able to modify, not only people’s equip-
ment, but also their way of life. For Meili, planning has a noble task: to ensure people’s
happiness by avoiding urbanization. Both authors illustrate this ‘haughty and totalitarian
dream tending to transform society through external forms’ [58] which is so typical of twen-
tieth century urban theories, such as Howard’s Garden Cities, Le Corbusier’s propositions
or CIAM functionalism. Most of these theories have condemned the evolution of modern
cities and suggested radical ways to change them and make them better.
Gravier’s book, became the Bible of French spatial planning. Paul Delouvrier, one of the
strongest personalities in French planning, believed initially in Gravier’s thesis: ‘We were all
fans of Gravier, that is, more or less convinced that Paris, particularly during the nineteenth
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century, had devoured the rest of France’. [59] Although drafted during the Vichy regime the
book had a fantastic impact later. In 1950, Eugène Claudius-Petit, Minister for Reconstruc-
tion, created the first division of national planning; a national fund for planning was
constituted the same year. The first National Committee for Planning, co-ordinating the
works of different ministries, was held in 1960.
After Gravier, planning in France has become a strange activity based on ideological
principles contrary to most observable facts. Gravier’s thesis was based on the belief that
Paris was devouring the resources of the rest of France but, curiously, no study of money
flows between French regions – which could have substantiated such a thesis – was made
for forty years. One had to wait until 1995 to obtain data on inter-regional flows of
public money. An invaluable document, [60] produced by the French Ministry of
Finances, but available only in Brussels because the European Commission requested it,
gave evidence of flows of public money cross-tabulating taxes paid by each French region
to the national budget, and the salaries and subsidies paid from the budget to each region.
The sum is nil: the State redistributes all contributions. In 1995, 19 out of 22 regions
received more money than they paid to the State. Three regions paid for all the others:
Alsace (Strasbourg) paid 300 million euros more than it received, Rhône-Alpes (Lyon, the
second city) paid 650 million more than it received, and the Ile-de-France (the Paris
region) contributed 18 billion euros more than it received from the national budget (1600
euros per capita each year, including babies and retired people). There is no reason to
believe that such flows were not so important in the past. If the flow of wealth from Paris
to the rest of the country is so significant, how is it possible that most French people
believe, and the media repeat, that ‘Paris is subsidized by the rest of the country’? Of
course, important political interests are at play, but such obfuscation of reality, with
enormous social and economic consequences covering half a century, is the main effect of
Gravier’s ideas.
Meili may not have played such an important role in Switzerland. The influence of his
ideas rests on the continuity of the concept of ‘concentrated decentralization’. Thanks to the
relative weakness of national or regional planning power in Switzerland, no active policy
against city growth has ever been imposed. The anti-urban climate eventually had an impact
on planning, but curiously contrary to Meili’s expectations. For decades after the war, the
role and importance of cities in Switzerland was completely ignored by town and country
planning. The city simply disappeared from the planning system. In the triumphant
‘planning paradigm’ of the 1960s, the big city became a locality like any others, which only
size and functions could differentiate. [61]
One of the best illustrations of this doctrine is the first federal planning law voted in 1979
that did not even contain the word ‘city’. This law emphasizes the protection of natural and
rural areas and the importance of regional balance, giving no place to the leading role of
cities in the economy. Urbanization is considered only through its negative impacts on the
hypothetical ‘national equilibrium’ and on the environment. The most important change
with regard to Meili’s ideology has occurred only in recent decades with cities and urbaniza-
tion no longer being considered as an interior enemy but as an economic force. It was only
in the 1990s, that the Swiss federal government officially recognized the fundamental impor-
tance of cities in the Swiss economy and, in particular, the role of Zurich as a national and
international economic and financial hub. [62]
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Conclusions
Although Meili and Gravier lived and worked in different countries, different traditions
and different environments, their works presented impressive similarities. Their argu-
ments against the big city, the extreme character of their statements (usually unsubstanti-
ated), their goals, their efforts to turn planning and public opinion away from the city,
their success in advocating economic policies that fight the city to subsidize the country-
side are based on a common ideology. Beyond the obvious interplay of private interests
and political schemes, one can guess the effect of long-standing condemnations of the
city that have a deep religious, moral and philosophical basis. Both writers concurred in
describing life in big cities as pure hell and moral perdition. Meili and Gravier agreed on
subjects as anachronistic as urban hygiene, mortality and birth rates. Both used out-of-
date arguments to cement their planning theory against the big city. They underlined the
horrors of loneliness but never showed the other side of the coin: great individual free-
dom. Since their judgements were mostly moralistic, they did not try to substantiate
them with arguments and evidence, but only by blunt statements and, quite often, with
bad faith.
Both men called for improved democracy and strong decentralization, but both advo-
cated planning methods that required authoritarian and centralized government: quite an
impressive contradiction. Both pretended to modernize their country but advocated a
return to the countryside and a struggle against cities. Both, maybe because of their back-
ground, ignored economic phenomena and did not discuss the effect of the policies they
advocated. For instance, neither seemed aware of the inflation in the cost of living that
farm subsidies and price control of agricultural products entails for city dwellers. Neither
discussed the fairness and the sociological consequences of such measures. Beyond oppor-
tunistic arguments, one can detect deep ideologies with very long time wavelengths lurking
behind the passionate statements. This is probably why the texts of Meili and especially
Gravier, which are not much more than political pamphlets, attracted so many followers
at a time when authoritarian ideologies were so powerful, but even more because they
represented expressions of fright and hate in the face of change, freedom and progress in
big cities.
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